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FEDERAL POWER, NON-FEDERAL ACTORS:
THE RAMIFICATIONS OF FREE ENTERPRISE
FUND
Harold J. Krent*
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board 1 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Congress’s decision to protect
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
from at will removal by the Securities and Exchange Commission, whose
members in turn are protected from at will removal at the hands of the
President. 2 The case arose out of Congress’s establishment of the Board as
part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 3 to regulate accounting methods and
procedures for publicly traded companies. 4 Accounting firms must register
with the Board and comply with its regulatory standards. 5 In addition, the
PCAOB conducts inspections of registered accounting firms, both on a
regular basis and in response to allegations of noncompliance with its
standards. 6 Free Enterprise Fund is the first decision in almost a century to
prohibit Congress from cushioning an executive branch official from
removal, and the decision, as a consequence, will refuel debate over the
scope and nature of independent agencies.
In the Court’s view, the congressional structure—in particular, the double
layer of tenure insulation—undermined the Article II imperative that all
exercises of significant executive authority be subject to strong supervision
by the President. As the Court explained, “[t]he diffusion of power carries
with it a diffusion of accountability. . . . Without a clear and effective chain
of command, the public cannot ‘determine on whom the blame or the
punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought
really to fall.’” 7 Given the departure from clear lines of authority, “[t]he
result is a Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President

* Dean and Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Jack
Beermann and Donna Nagy for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Katherine
Jahnke for her research assistance.
1. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
2. Id. at 3164. The Supreme Court so concluded on the basis of the parties’ stipulation.
Id. at 3148–49; id. at 3182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
4. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147–49.
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7212–7213 (2006).
6. Id. § 7214.
7. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155 (2010) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70
(Alexander Hamilton)).
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who is not responsible for the Board.” 8 The dissenters questioned why
removal should be viewed as so central to the question of accountability
under Article II, as opposed to other supervisory tools, such as rulemaking,
funding, and the like.9 The dissent expressed concern for the fate of
analogous agency structures that the majority decision placed in jeopardy,
such as for administrative law judges shielded from at will dismissal at the
hands of agency officials who themselves also are removable only for
cause. 10
Curiously, the dissenting opinion only tangentially considered the impact
of the majority’s decision on delegations outside the executive branch. The
Court’s insistence in Free Enterprise Fund on formal presidential control
over an inferior executive branch entity should cast grave doubt on the
constitutionality of comparable congressional delegations to private entities.
Should Congress delegate to a private or state entity, no removal is likely
possible, let alone the removal for cause found insufficient in Free
Enterprise Fund. Had Congress delegated the same financial oversight
duties scrutinized in Free Enterprise Fund to a commission comprised of
the heads of Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, and Ernst &
Young, the President’s removal authority would be further eroded, as would
be the case if Congress had delegated that authority to a commission of
state secretaries of the Treasury. The recent Supreme Court decision
therefore may toll congressional experimentation to vest executive authority
in private and state hands.
Ironically, Congress by its own terms created the PCAOB outside of the
federal government. Congress provided that members of the Board were
not to be considered “officer[s] . . . or agent[s of] the Federal
Government.” 11 Moreover, Congress determined that the Board “shall not
be an agency or establishment of the United States Government.” 12
Congress also determined that the salary of Board members should be set in
accordance with the private market.13 Congress presumably wished to
ensure that individuals with wide experience in public accounting could be
persuaded to participate in the regulatory initiative. 14 Had the Court taken
Congress at its word, then its path in Free Enterprise Fund might have been
much simpler. The Court could have assessed whether Congress had the
8. Id. at 3153.
9. Id. at 3179–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. app. A, at 3184–92.
10. Id. at 3180–81.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (2006).
12. Id.
13. See Donna M. Nagy, Is the PCAOB A “Heavily Controlled Component” of the
SEC?: An Essential Question in the Constitutional Controversy, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 361,
372 (2010) (noting that PCAOB Board members’ “salaries are almost four times the amount
received by the SEC’s Chairman and Commissioners, but are comparable to those
commanded in the private sector.”); see also S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 7 (2002) (stating that
competitive salaries for PCAOB staff members were essential to ensure that the “Board have
a strong, well-trained, and experienced staff, of sufficient size to carry out its
responsibilities”).
14. See Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and Financial
Regulation: The Case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 485, 504–06 (2009).
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power to delegate the accounting and inspection duties to an outside entity
and thereby avoided its more controversial decision that the double layer of
tenure insulation violated Article II. The logic of the majority’s decision
seemingly would have militated for invalidation on the ground that such
significant authority could not, consistent with Article II, be vested in a
private entity. 15 Indeed, much of the early controversy surrounding the
creation of the PCAOB focused on whether a private entity could discharge
the regulatory role that Congress in fact assigned to the Board.16 The Court
in part dismissed that line of inquiry only because it accepted the parties’
stipulations that the Board, despite Congress’s labeling to the contrary,
should be considered a public entity. 17
The Obama administration has seemed willing to share power with both
private and state entities. Congress, with the President’s acquiescence, has
proposed that a private entity—the National Academy of Sciences—play a
determinative role in setting global warming policy. 18 In addition, the
administration agreed to a proposal creating a private Cybersecurity
Advisory Panel that could have vetoed the Department of Commerce’s
contract with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN). 19 Moreover, the health care reform bill includes a delegation to
a state entity, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC), to determine medical loss ratio standards which, to some extent,
are binding on the Department of Health and Human Services.20 These
initiatives have received scant attention.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund, therefore,
provides renewed reason to consider whether congressional delegations
outside the federal government pose the same threat to accountability as
does delegation to the PCAOB. In Part I, I argue that the reasoning in the
recent Supreme Court decision should apply to delegations outside, as well
15. With respect to the removal provision, Chief Justice Roberts confusingly observed
that,
The rigorous standard that must be met before a Board member may be removed was
drawn from statutes concerning private organizations like the New York Stock
Exchange. While we need not decide the question here, a removal standard appropriate
for limiting Government control over private bodies may be inappropriate for officers
wielding the executive power of the United States.
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158 (citation omitted). Rather, the relevant question should
be whether the individual to be removed is exercising significant authority under the laws of
the United States.
16. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and
Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1000–03 (2005).
17. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148 (citing Brief for Petitioners, Free Enter. Fund,
130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861) 2009 WL 2247130, at *9 n.1; Brief for the U.S, Free Enter.
Fund, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861) 2009 WL 3290435, at *29 n.8). The Court also posited
that congressional labeling was not dispositive, relying on its prior opinion in Lebron v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995). Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at
3148.
18. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Bill), H.R.
2454, 111th Cong. § 707.
19. S. 773, 111th Cong. § 8 (2010).
20. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2715, 124 Stat.
119, 885–87 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15).
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as inside, the federal government. I summarize reasons that I have
previously presented for why delegations to private parties should be
cabined. 21 Free Enterprise Fund, in my view, strongly supports that view
and suggests that the roles accorded to private entities in the Cybersecurity
and National Academy of Sciences examples would be unconstitutional,
admittedly despite prior Supreme Court precedents that seemingly
countenance such delegations.
In Part II, however, I conclude that a similar delegation to a state entity
should survive the Free Enterprise Fund analysis. Although the same
concern for executive branch control exists, our structure of federalism
presupposes that the federal government can share power with the states.
Even though lines of accountability can become blurred, as in the NAIC
example, accountability nonetheless can be attained through the political
process in the respective states. Moreover, the fear of congressional
aggrandizement is much reduced when Congress delegates to state as
opposed to private entities. Accordingly, this Essay concludes that Free
Enterprise Fund should bar delegations of significant authority to private
individuals and groups, but leave untouched most congressional efforts to
share power with state governmental entities.
I. DELEGATION JURISPRUDENCE AND FREE ENTERPRISE FUND
Congress at times has experimented by delegating a range of duties to
private parties. Indeed, Presidents largely have acquiesced in such
delegations. As with the congressional creation of the PCAOB, eliciting
private party participation more directly can ensure greater expertise in
governing and provide political cover for potentially unpopular regulatory
initiatives.
A. Prior Judicial Precedents
Although most delegations to private parties have gone unchallenged by
litigants, courts have reviewed challenges to a number of congressional
schemes. The canonical case is Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 22 There, the
Supreme Court considered a statutory scheme in which a majority of
miners, and the producers of two-thirds of the annual tonnage of coal,
established working conditions that would bind the entire group.23 The
maximum hours of work could be set, as well as the minimum wage. 24 The
Court explained that “[t]he effect, in respect to wages and hours, is to
subject the dissentient minority . . . to the will of the stated majority.” 25 In
other words, “[t]he power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the
power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority.” 26 The Court
21. See Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegation to
Private Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507 (2011).
22. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
23. Id. at 310–11.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 311.
26. Id.
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concluded that “[t]his is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form;
for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively
disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are
adverse to the interests of others in the same business.” 27 To the Court, the
private status of the decisionmakers rendered the delegation more suspect.
In A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 28 as well, the Court
questioned Congress’s reliance on private parties to establish codes of fair
competition under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). 29 Under
the Act, trade groups proposed codes of fair competition for ultimate
approval by the President. 30 The Court struck down those sections of the
NIRA on both nondelegation and Commerce Clause grounds.31
In so doing, the Court noted the sweeping power exercised by private
entities, even though the proposed codes were subject to presidential
authorization. The Court asked, “would it be seriously contended that
Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial
associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem
to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade
or industries?” 32 Although acknowledging that Congress understandably
might wish to delegate to private parties “because such associations or
groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises,” the Court
emphatically stated that “[s]uch a delegation of legislative power is
unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional
prerogatives and duties of Congress.” 33
No delegation to private parties after Carter Coal and Schechter,
however, has been invalidated. Courts subsequently have upheld powers
delegated to producer groups under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937 34 and similar statutes. 35 In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins 36 for example, the Supreme Court held that the advisory role private
27. Id.
28. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
29. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, invalidated by Schechter, 295 U.S. 495.
30. Schecter, 295 U.S. at 521–22.
31. Id. at 551. Congress has delegated to private parties in numerous other contexts and
these delegations have, on occasion, been more direct. In 1893, Congress delegated
authority to the American Railway Association to establish a mandatory height for drawbars
on railroad cars, and legislated that failure to comply with the height requirement subjected
all railroad companies to civil penalties. Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531. The
Supreme Court upheld the delegation with little discussion. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain &
S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 285–87 (1908). Further, private parties have served on
governmental agencies such as the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which
operates as part of the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. § 263 (2006). The private
members are elected annually by the boards of directors of the twelve regional Federal
Reserve Banks, which are privately owned. Id. The FOMC as a whole discharges the critical
policymaking function of determining sales and purchases of government securities in the
open market. See id.
32. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537.
33. Id.
34. Ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
35. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2118 (2006) (cotton); id. §§ 2901–2911 (beef); id.
§§ 4501–4514 (dairy).
36. 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
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producers played in recommending coal prices did not constitute an
unlawful delegation of executive power to private individuals because the
private members “function[ed] subordinately to the [public] Commission.
It, not the [private producers], determines the prices.” 37 Evidence that the
Commission rubberstamped the determinations made by private producers
was not dispositive. 38 In other words, the Court reasoned that private
groups do not exercise problematic authority if the executive branch holds
the formal power to approve whatever is forwarded by the private entity.
Even though the private groups in effect make law, the required
governmental approval makes the delegation acceptable.39 The Supreme
Court has reasoned, therefore, that no untoward delegation of private
authority exists if sufficient oversight can be exercised by federal
governmental officials.
The Supreme Court manifested an even more lenient approach in
Schweiker v. McClure. 40 There, the Court considered a Due Process
challenge to private adjudication under the Medicare Part B program.41
Under the Part B Program, Congress authorized the Secretary to contract
with private insurance carriers to review and pay out deserving claims.42
Carrier determinations are subject to a limited right of review by hearing
officers who are also appointed by the carrier. 43 As a practical matter, the
decision of the private hearing officer is conclusive. The lower court
invalidated this system of private adjudication, reasoning that due process
required additional procedural safeguards. 44 Accordingly, it ordered de
novo hearings before an administrative judge of the Social Security
Administration. 45
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, finding that, as long as the
Secretary directs the carriers to appoint only “an attorney or other qualified
individual with the ability to conduct formal hearings and with a general
understanding of medical matters and terminology,” no risk of erroneous

37. Id. at 399; see also Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 86–87 (3d Cir. 1984); Chiglades
Farm, Ltd. v. Butz, 485 F.2d 1125, 1133–34 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Correctional Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (refusing to extend a Bivens cause of action to private
prison operator).
38. As Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo stated in concurrence in Schechter, “it is the
imprimatur of the President that begets the quality of law,” not the plans forwarded for
approval by the trade groups. 295 U.S. at 552 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
39. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 6 (1939) (designation of tobacco marketing
areas); United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577–78 (1939); H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U.S. 588, 595 (1939); United States v. Frame, 885
F.2d 1119, 1125–29 (3d Cir. 1989) (beef program); United States v. MacMullen, 262 F.2d
499, 500–01 (2d Cir. 1958) (wheat quotas).
40. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
41. Id. at 192.
42. Id. at 190.
43. Id. at 191 (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.807–.812 (1980)); see also Bowen v. Mich. Acad.
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) (sketching the limited availability of judicial
review under Part B).
44. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 195.
45. Id.
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deprivation existed. 46 The fact that the hearing officers were private did not
create any untoward risk of self-dealing, particularly because the funds used
to satisfy the judgments came from the United States Treasury as opposed
to the carriers (and hearing officers) themselves. 47
Taken together, Sunshine Anthracite and Schweiker v. McClure suggest a
wide ambit for the private exercise of delegated authority. Private parties
can exercise authority, backed by the coercive power of the state, as long as
the authority is confined to a relatively narrow scope (as in Sunshine
Anthracite and Schweiker) or is subject to review by executive branch
officials (as in Sunshine Anthracite).
Lower courts have so construed those precedents, permitting delegations
to private entities for varied purposes. In Cospito v. Heckler,48 for instance,
the question raised was whether Congress could delegate to a private group,
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), the power to
determine whether a hospital was eligible for Medicaid and Medicare
reimbursement. 49 The private group assessed the quality of care at health
care institutions to determine eligibility for participation in the Medicare
and Medicaid programs. 50 One pertinent provision with respect to
psychiatric hospitals provided that such hospitals could be certified “if such
distinct part meets requirements equivalent to such [JCAH] accreditation
requirements as determined by the Secretary.” 51 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that the Secretary’s power under the Acts to
bypass determinations made by the JCAH salvaged the delegation.52
Accordingly, “[s]ince, in effect, all actions of JCAH are subject to full
review by a public official who is responsible and responsive to the political
process, we find that there has been no real delegation of authority to
JCAH.” 53 Judge Edward R. Becker in dissent scoffed at the majority’s
reasoning, stating that the JCAH at the relevant time “might ‘define’ a
‘psychiatric hospital’ however it chose, and might use whatever procedures
it wished in developing that definition . . . . and the JCAH regulations were
not subject to judicial or administrative review . . . . The JCAH’s freedom
to apply its regulations to individual hospitals was also unfettered.” 54 He
concluded that “courts should not permit Congress to delegate to private
bodies, that are not required by statute to listen to affected parties in making

46. Id. at 199 (internal quotations omitted).
47. Id. at 196.
48. 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984).
49. Id. at 74–75, 79; see also, e.g., City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 359–60 (5th
Cir. 1999) (upholding delegation to determine whether particular cable operators could
access video systems); Geo-Tech Reclamation Indus., Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 666
(4th Cir. 1989) (upholding delegation to communities in effect to veto landfill permits if
sufficient opposition were voiced).
50. Cospito, 742 F.2d at 75–77.
51. Id. at 76.
52. Id. at 88.
53. Id. at 89.
54. Id. at 90 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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their regulations, and whose regulations are not subject to review under the
Administrative Procedure Act.” 55
Similarly, in Todd & Co., Inc. v. SEC 56 the Third Circuit considered
whether Congress’s delegation of authority to the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) constituted an unconstitutional delegation to a
private entity. 57 The Maloney Act authorized the self-regulatory entity to
promulgate rules protecting against fraudulent and unethical practices, and
to discipline members who failed to conform to the standards
promulgated. 58 Congress authorized the SEC to review the NASD’s
A brokerage house contested an NASD
findings upon appeal. 59
investigation of its activities on the ground that the Maloney Act constituted
an undue delegation to a private entity. 60 The court rejected the challenge
because the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) retained the power
“to approve or disapprove the Association’s rules,” to make additional
findings if necessary, and “make an independent decision on the violation
and penalty.” 61 Accordingly, the court found no impermissible exercise of
authority by the self-regulatory entity. Even when Congress eliminated the
SEC’s right to make additional findings to add to the record, the court in a
subsequent case similarly sustained the delegation to the self-regulatory
entity. 62 Much as in Schweiker v. McClure, the court was not concerned,
from an Article II vantage point, with the authority exercised by private
decisionmakers.
Based on cases prior to Free Enterprise Fund, the proposed delegations
to the National Academy of Sciences and the Cybersecurity Panel would
likely be upheld. 63 In both cases, the ambit of authority delegated is
narrow—in one case concerning only attainment of particular carbon
emission standards and, in the other, the ICANN contract. Moreover,
executive branch officials must act in conjunction with the private parties in
both cases before effecting national policy. In the global warming setting,
the President must issue a presidential order to cut emissions further and,
with respect to cybersecurity, the Department of Commerce retains the
power to re-craft any subsequent ICANN contract. The private parties may
shape or nudge executive branch action, but their acts do not replace it. As
the next part argues, however, Free Enterprise Fund destabilizes any such
assumption.

55. Id. at 91.
56. 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977).
57. Id. at 1011–12.
58. Id. at 1012.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See First Jersey Secs. Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 697–700 (3d Cir. 1979)
(following Todd, even though Congress had subsequently weakened SEC oversight of the
NASD’s findings).
63. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
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B. Free Enterprise Fund and Article II
From the perspective of the Free Enterprise Fund majority, delegations
to private parties threaten the Constitution by circumventing the executive
branch control that was designed to protect all individuals from
governmental overreaching. The President’s appointment and removal
authorities are both implicated, for, as discussed in Free Enterprise Fund,
they provide the “key constitutional means” for the President to retain
control over authority delegated by Congress. 64
1. The Appointment Authority
Although Free Enterprise Fund pinned its decision on the President’s
removal authority under Article II, an understanding of the Appointments
Clause, from which the removal authority is drawn, sets the stage for the
Court’s reasoning. 65 Under the Appointments Clause, Presidents enjoy the
power to appoint all superior officers of the United States.66 Through the
appointment power, Presidents can ensure that only officers they approve of
are enforcing the law. Article II provides that the President must appoint all
superior officers, and that Congress can decide whether to vest appointment
authority over inferior officers in the President, heads of departments, or
courts of law. 67 There have been disagreements over line drawing,
particularly between superior and inferior officers,68 but consensus exists
over the role that the Appointments Clause plays under the Constitution.
The President’s choice of officer influences the exercise of delegated
authority. 69
In Buckley v. Valeo, 70 the Court chose “significant authority” as a
threshold for triggering the Appointments Clause, and explained that the
term encompassed “broad administrative powers: rulemaking, advisory
Although
opinions, and determinations of eligibility for funds.”71
investigation and information gathering did not rise to the significant
authority level, 72 all individuals exercising more formal power to affect the
rights of third parties must be considered officers of the United States and
subject to Article II limitations. 73 In addition, all officers of the United
64. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. See Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting Appointments
Clause issue that would arise from permitting federal government to delegate
decisionmaking authority to states over pollution attainment policy).
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
67. Id.
68. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988).
69. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118–41 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
117, 163–64 (1926).
70. 424 U.S. 1.
71. Id. at 126, 140.
72. Id. at 137.
73. Id. at 138–43. Individuals exercising authority that is only intermittent, however,
may fall outside the Buckley rule. See Krent, supra note 21, at 536.
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States must take an oath of office to uphold the Constitution. 74 That oath
signifies a more profound obligation to the public trust than a mere
contractual duty. For serious malfeasance in office, officers can be
impeached. 75
Congressional delegations of authority to private parties—whether to a
producer group, single individual, or the National Academy of Sciences—
bypass the presidential appointment authority.
If Congress vested
significant authority in the Cybersecurity Panel, the resulting execution of
the law could not be as readily traced to the President, and his appointment
authority would be circumvented. 76 As the Supreme Court stressed in
Edmond v. United States, 77 “the Appointments Clause . . . is more than a
matter of ‘etiquette or protocol’; it is among the significant structural
safeguards of the constitutional scheme. By vesting the President with
exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United
States,
the
Appointments
Clause
prevents
congressional
encroachment . . . .” 78
Moreover, the Supreme Court has insisted that Congress play no direct
role in the appointment of officers. In Buckley, the Court considered a
congressional measure empowering the Speaker of the House and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate to appoint four members of the newly
created electoral commission under the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. 79 The Court held that Congress could neither participate in the
appointment process directly nor indirectly, and noted that the “debates of
the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with
expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National Government
will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches.”80
Respecting the President’s appointment authority was critical to ensuring
that Congress would take no part in executing the law through appointing
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
75. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. The Secretary of Treasury appointed Kenneth Feinberg, a
New York attorney, to set the compensation that executives of entities receiving Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds can earn. See 74 Fed. Reg. 28,394 (June 15, 2009) (to
be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30); Eric Dash, The Walking Wounded, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2009, at B1. Given that Feinberg issued binding orders affecting private rights, his status as
an officer seems relatively clear, yet Congress did not lodge his appointment in the Secretary
of Treasury as would be required under Article II to legitimate the appointment. Thus,
appointment of Feinberg can only comport with the Constitution if he is not considered an
“officer of the United States.” See Michael W. McConnell, Op-Ed., The Pay Czar Is
Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2009, at A25.
76. For those embracing a theory of directory authority, the lack of presidential
appointment is not fatal. Rather, if the President can order state officials to take particular
positions or substitute state officials’ decisions for his own, or so the argument goes, then
fidelity to Article II is maintained. Not only do I challenge the existence of such directory
authority, see Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV.
523 (2008), but any presidential bossing of state officials would almost surely violate the
federalism principles built into the Tenth Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes
148–54
77. 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
78. Id. at 659.
79. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113.
80. Id. at 129.
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officers. If Congress retained close supervision of the private delegate, then
Congress in essence would oversee execution of its own laws, a role that
the Supreme Court has held would conflict with the Constitution. 81
Similarly, in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 82 the Court considered whether
Congress, in establishing a compact to oversee the administration of D.C.
area airports, could subject major decisions of that compact to a board of
review, consisting of nine members of Congress in their individual
capacities as users of the airports. 83 The Court held that the board of
review, through its veto power, exercised significant authority pursuant to
the laws of the United States and hence invalidated the continuing
congressional role on the board. 84 In the eyes of the Court, the board was
“a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power.”85
Congressional delegation of power to private individuals outside the
purview of the Appointments Clause cannot easily be reconciled with Free
Enterprise Fund.
At times, congressional delegation to private parties may permit the
President to exercise the appointment power. Consider Congress’s creation
of the United States Railway Association to monitor the Consolidated Rail
Corporation (CONRAIL) and issue bonds, among other duties. 86 In so
doing, Congress provided that a majority of the Association’s members
were to be drawn by the President from lists of private individuals supplied
by the AFL-CIO and Association of American Railroads. 87 The vast
majority of congressional delegations, however, whether to producer groups
or the National Academy of Sciences, bypass the President’s appointment
power.
2. The Removal Authority
The Supreme Court also has recognized the President’s inherent right
under Article II to remove any executive branch officer subject to his
appointment power. Although there has been much litigation over whether
that removal authority should be plenary, 88 the Court repeatedly has held
that the removal power follows the appointment authority. 89 In Myers v.

81. See infra text accompanying notes 106–14.
82. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
83. Id. at 255.
84. Id. at 277.
85. Id.
86. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 210(a), 87 Stat.
985, 1000 (1974).
87. Id. § 201(d), 87 Stat. at 988.
88. E.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675–76 (1988) (questioning the adequacy of
the President’s authority over the independent counsel); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
723 (1986) (questioning the adequacy of the President’s removal authority over the
Comptroller General).
89. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671; Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726; Weiner v. United States, 357
U.S. 349, 353 (1985); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–30 (1935);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126–27 (1926).
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United States, the Supreme Court stated that “Article II grants the President
the executive power of the Government, . . . the power of appointment and
removal of executive officers—a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 90 The President must be
able to remove a superior officer “on the ground that the discretion
regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the whole
intelligently or wisely exercised.” 91 Presidents cannot superintend the
administration of laws effectively if they cannot, as a last resort, threaten to
discharge officials, at least if the officers are neglectful of their duties.
Again, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court stressed the importance of the
removal provision in permitting the President “sufficient control over the
independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his
constitutionally assigned duties.” 92 Although the Court concluded in the
case of the independent counsel that the removal authority need not be
plenary, some form of removal authority was constitutionally required and,
together with other control mechanisms, must ensure that the President
retain sufficient control to exercise his constitutionally assigned duties.93
The Free Enterprise Fund decision reinforces the focus on hierarchical
authority flowing from Article II: the “executive power included a power to
oversee executive officers through removal.” 94 To the Court, exercise of
close removal authority was critical to ensuring presidential supervision
under Article II. Otherwise, the President’s “ability to execute the laws—
by holding his subordinates accountable for their conduct—is impaired.” 95
The fact that neither the President nor the SEC could remove members of
the PCAOB at will, while members of the SEC were themselves protected
from at will dismissal, was determinative. 96 The Court concluded that,
without sufficient removal authority, “the President could not be held fully
accountable for discharging his own responsibilities.” 97
Congressional delegations to private parties may deprive Presidents of
the removal power. If Congress lodges the power to set standards in a
private group, for example, the President cannot remove members of that
group from office. 98 Congressional delegation to a private accounting
group such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) to set standards binding on the public would be problematic. The
private group could formulate binding standards, yet the members could not
be removed even if the President disagreed with the standards selected.
90. Myers, 272 U.S. at 163–64.
91. Id. at 135.
92. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 658.
93. Id. at 695–96.
94. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152
(2010).
95. Id. at 3154.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 3164.
98. Contrast to Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), in which the President
could remove Article III judges sitting on the Sentencing Commission from their
administrative duties, although he could not affect their roles as judges. Id. at 411.
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Moreover, under the global warming bill, the President could not remove
members of the National Academy of Sciences even if he believed they
engaged in misconduct. 99 Similarly, if Congress designates a particular
insurance company to resolve Medicare claims, the President would not be
able to switch insurance companies if he determined that the company’s
handling of claims was wasteful or inefficient. Private parties largely are
“immune from Presidential oversight, even as they exercise[] power in the
people’s name.” 100 As the Court summarized in Free Enterprise Fund,
“[t]he diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability.”101
On occasion, Congress may permit the President to remove a private
individual from a multi-member commission as in the prior United States
Railway Association example. 102 But, the vast majority of such delegations
seemingly confound the Free Enterprise Fund imperative that the President
wield sufficiently direct removal authority over all entities exercising
federal law.
Of course, the President may wield substantial control even aside from
the appointment and removal authorities. Justice Breyer in dissent
addressed the controls that can stem from funding, rulemaking, ex ante or
ex post review of policies, and other mechanisms. 103 To the dissent, the
question was whether, taken as a whole, the President exerted enough
influence to assure that the essential attributes of the executive power
remained vested in the executive. 104 But, to the majority, the removal
authority was talismanic—in the absence of such formal linkage, the
President could not be assured effective oversight.105
In addition, although Congress may remove an individual in the
executive branch from office by abolishing the entire office, it can effect
removal of a private entity more directly merely by switching delegates. A
congressional threat to withdraw authority or funding from a private entity
like the AICPA can influence behavior—the private officeholder may
attempt to placate Congress to retain its power. 106 The Supreme Court
categorically has determined that Congress itself can play no role in the
removal of individuals exercising significant authority under the laws of the
United States. 107

99. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
100. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154.
101. Id. at 3155.
102. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
103. Id. at 3169 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 3169–73.
105. See id. at 3155 (majority opinion) (“By granting the Board executive power without
the Executive’s oversight, this Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts.”).
106. If Congress eliminated the funding mechanism under which the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) currently operates, the private standard setting group
could no longer function.
107. Justice Breyer in dissent stressed that congressional arrangements that can result in
congressional aggrandizement of executive power are most likely to violate the separation of
powers doctrine. Id. at 3167 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Bowsher v. Synar 108 is illustrative. In
invalidating the Comptroller General’s role under the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act, 109 the Court focused on the critical importance of the removal
authority. 110 Although the President appoints the Comptroller General to a
fifteen-year term of office, Congress made the Comptroller General
removable at the initiative of Congress for any one of several causes.111
The Court held that “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of
removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws.” 112 The
Court explained that “once Congress makes its choice in enacting
legislation, its participation ends.”113 Otherwise, Congress would both be
able to exercise a de facto appointment and removal authority, permitting it
to influence the exercise of delegated authority. Indeed, in Myers the Court
invalidated Congress’s participation in removal of the postmaster.114
Viewed through an Article II lens, congressional determinations to
delegate significant authority outside the President’s control are suspect.
The President’s Article II powers of appointment and removal are designed
not merely to augment executive power, but to protect individual liberty.
To ensure that public power is exercised in a responsible way, the President
should stand formally accountable for the exercise of authority delegated by
Congress. Congressional delegations to trade groups and others can rob the
President of his power to coordinate law implementation efforts and, at the
same time, permit Congress too much influence in the execution of law.
The question remains where to draw the line between impermissible and
valid exercises of authority by private parties. Eliciting advice from private
parties does not violate Article II, but directing private parties to set trade
policy would contravene presidential power. The analysis in Free
Enterprise Fund does not illuminate how to set the constitutional test. The
rulemaking, inspection, and enforcement duties of the PCAOB fell on the
wrong side of the line because all parties recognized that, in the aggregate,
the PCAOB exercised significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States and could only be appointed and removed in conformance
with Article II. Although I have argued elsewhere that the doctrinal test for
delegation to private parties should focus on whether the private party’s acts
bind other private parties backed by the coercive power of the
government, 115 the key here is that the Supreme Court’s recent decision
makes it far more likely that congressional delegations of authority to
private parties will elicit closer scrutiny by the Supreme Court should such
challenges arise in the future. Free Enterprise Fund may well have
sounded the death knell for delegations of significant authority to private
parties.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

478 U.S. 714 (1986).
2 U.S.C. §§ 901–07 (2006).
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727.
Id. at 720; id. at 785 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 726 (majority opinion).
Id. at 733.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926).
See generally Krent, supra note 21.
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Indeed, the majority in Free Enterprise Fund might have bolstered its
reasoning by pointing to the dearth of government-wide regulations
applicable to the PCAOB. Congress declared that the PCAOB should not
be considered an “agency” and therefore it absolved the entity of the need
to comply with the APA. 116 Moreover, Congress specifically exempted the
PCAOB unlike almost all other governmental entities from the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). 117 Thus, in comparison to other agencies, fewer
government-wide controls constrained the conduct of the entity’s work. As
a consequence, the argument for enhanced centralized control of the type
advocated by the majority is more compelling. In fashioning the PCAOB
more like a private entity, Congress inadvertently strengthened the case for
greater presidential control.
Consider as well the self-regulatory model that Congress rejected in
creating the PCAOB. Prior to enactment of the PCAOB, the SEC in effect
delegated standard setting to the AICPA. 118 After Free Enterprise Fund,
such delegations to private entities are suspect—the President would not be
able to oversee development of such standards through the threat of
exercising the removal authority. 119 The President must be permitted the
discretion to accept, reject, or modify the standards selected by private
entities.
Similarly, the Free Enterprise Fund case calls into question other
congressional delegations to private parties. Congress has authorized selfregulatory organizations such as the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) to investigate and prosecute violations of federal
law. 120 Firms wishing to trade securities have no choice but to join a selfregulatory organization.121 Firms and individuals disciplined, whether
through fines or withdrawal of trading privileges, have a right of appeal to
the SEC, but the SEC cannot add any findings to the record. 122 There is
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006) (limiting applicability of APA to agencies (i.e.,
authorities) of the United States).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(5)(A) (2006).
118. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law:
Copyright,
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 294 (2005). In essence,
Congress had delegated comparable authority to the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA)
through the middle of the twentieth century. Nagy, supra note 16, at 985–87. Since 1973,
the SEC has recognized the Financial Accounting Standards Board as the official entity
setting standards for public company accounting. See Commission Statement of Policy
Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter,
Securities Act Release No. 8221, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003); Exchange Act
Release No. 47,743, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003); Accounting Series Release No.
150, 3 SEC Docket 275 (Dec. 20, 1973). Note that if Congress merely adopted preexisting
AICPA standards, no constitutional problem would arise.
119. To be sure, there is a fine line between standard setting that represents the exercise
of significant authority within the meaning of Buckley, and classifications that the
government can contract out to private contractors to formulate. See Practice Mgmt. Info.
Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (addressing Congress’s instruction to
the Health Care Financing Administration to establish uniform code for assessing
reimbursement for physician services), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
120. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2006).
121. Id. § 78o(b)(8).
122. Id. § 78s(e)(1), (f).
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some disagreement as to whether the SEC’s standard of review of FINRA’s
findings is de novo. 123 Does FINRA, in investigating and then adjudicating
violations of federal law, exercise significant authority pursuant to the
After Free
statutes authorizing the self-regulatory mechanism? 124
Enterprise Fund, such delegations may be permissible only if the
government can exercise exacting review before exchange determinations
become final. 125
Free Enterprise Fund teaches that delegation outside the federal
government may undermine the President’s Article II obligation to
superintend law enforcement by robbing him of his powers to appoint and
remove from office those exercising significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States. How one defines the quantum of authority that
only can be exercised subject to presidential direction becomes pivotal.
Although the Court has yet to tackle that challenge, private entities such as
the American Bar Association can evaluate nominees for office and offer
advice 126 without transgressing the line, but permitting private entities to
resolve federal claims without exacting review by a governmental agency
would constitute the exercise of significant authority and therefore
contravene the animating spirit of Free Enterprise Fund.
II. DELEGATIONS TO STATE ENTITIES
Congress long has delegated to state as well as private entities. Congress
has approved state compacts to address issues of federal interest and
specified goals to be accomplished. Congress has also encouraged states to
take responsibility to enforce federal standards such as those under the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 127 Moreover, Congress has
authorized state officials to enforce a wide range of federal laws, most
notoriously under the Fugitive Slave and Volstead Acts.128 Congress has
also incorporated state law as federal policy, such as under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 129 which signifies that federal rules of decision automatically

123. Compare Whiteside & Co. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 7, 9 (5th Cir. 1989) (asserting that
review of findings by the self regulatory organization is de novo), with Seaton v. SEC, 670
F.2d 309, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (utilizing preponderance of the evidence standard). But see
MBH Commodity Advisors v. CFTC, 250 F.3d 1052, 1062–64 (7th Cir. 2001) (suggesting
that each agency may construe statutory provision providing for review of self-regulatory
organizations’ findings differently, depending on mission of agency).
124. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008).
125. Moreover, Free Enterprise Fund squarely places the status of the adjudicators in
Schweiker v. McClure in doubt. Those adjudicators resolved claims between private parties
and the government without meaningful review by the Department of Health and Human
Services.
126. See Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455–65 (1989).
127. See, e.g., Train v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
128. National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919); Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302, 302.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the
provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances . . . .”).
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shift with changes in state law. Finally, Congress has delegated specific
enforcement tasks to state entities as in the NAIC example.
Much of the analysis in Free Enterprise Fund logically should apply to
the above contexts in which Congress delegates authority to state entities.
Two key components of presidential control are absent. The President
likely neither appoints nor removes the state entity that is implementing or
enforcing federal law. In the health care reform statute, the President does
not appoint state insurance commissioners, nor can he remove them from
the NAIC. 130 In addition, the President does not enjoy the power
unilaterally to withdraw the delegation from the NAIC. Congress therefore
may leave execution of federal law outside the President’s control by dint
of delegation to state entities. Lines of accountability unquestionably can
become muddled, as responsibility for the ultimate policy pursued is shared
among Congress, which consented to the compact, the individual states that
are in the compact, and the state officials who are acting to implement the
policy selected. 131
Nonetheless, I argue that delegations to state entities fundamentally differ
from those to private entities for three principal reasons. First, the
Constitution anticipates congressional sharing of power with state far more
than private entities. Second, state officials are more accountable to the
electorate—whether directly or indirectly—than are private entities. Third,
there is far less danger of congressional aggrandizement in the context of
delegation to state entities.
Delegations to state entities, however, should not be immune from
Article II analysis of the type articulated in Free Enterprise Fund. In the
final section, I examine two contexts in which delegations to state entities
raise distinctive constitutional problems: first, when the delegation
impinges on a presidential power separate from this “take care” authority,
such as in foreign relations; and second, when Congress delegates to
favored states the power to impose costs on others. I tentatively conclude
that judicial review is relatively cost free in the first setting and that limits
on delegation accordingly should be enforced, but that judicial review is not
worth the costs in the second. Thus, although a particular delegation to a
state entity might violate the Constitution, the Free Enterprise Fund
analysis should not apply as strictly as in the private delegate context. As a
consequence, the delegation to the NAIC likely comports with the
constitutional structure.

130. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
131. If the President could supervise state entities’ and officials’ exercise of delegated
authority, the constitutional problem would recede, and so Professor Steven G. Calabresi has
argued. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). It is difficult to conceive, however, how Presidents
could oversee or alter implementation efforts by state officials and entities. Indeed, the
prospect that Presidents could reverse decisions made by state officials would turn
federalism principles on their head. See also supra note 76.
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A. The Case for Upholding Delegation to State Entities
As with delegations generally, Congress may have myriad reasons to
recruit state entities to help implement federal law. Congress, for example,
may wish to elicit the expertise of officials in state government. The NAIC
example illustrates this rationale—state insurance commissioners
presumably have greater familiarity and experience with medical loss ratios
than does the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 132
Similarly, delegations to states to fashion rules to implement federal
mandates under the EPA reflect efforts to enlist the help of officials with
more immediate knowledge of the conditions affecting each respective
state. 133
Delegations to state entities also can ensure that those closest to the
dispute have a more direct say in governance. Cases involving boundary
disputes among the states provide a clear example, as do the compacts
among states operating port authorities or other transportation hubs. States
may find congressional delegation more palatable when they can participate
in shaping the rules that affect them so directly. Similarly, in the Free
Enterprise Fund case, Justice Breyer in dissent cited the delegation to the
Delta Regional Authority. 134 By dint of that delegation, states within the
lower Mississippi delta region make the development decisions critical to
their future economic growth.
Some delegations to state entities facilitate efficient implementation of
the laws. State officials should be able to detect some federal law
violations with less expense than federal enforcement officials. State
officials investigating state crimes may well learn of conduct that gives rise
to federal law violations. And, by predicating the Federal Tort Claims Act
on state law, Congress need not fashion independent standards of care and
rules of recovery. State legislatures and courts have been setting standards
of care for generations.
Finally, some congressional delegations to state entities presumably stem
from congressional reluctance to discharge the responsibilities. Law
enforcement under the Fugitive Slave Act provides one example, as may
congressional delegations of the power to run D.C. area airports or to
determine where low level radioactive waste should be stored.135 As with
delegations more generally, Congress may wish to duck responsibility for
tough political choices. In all, Congress has many understandable reasons
for delegating authority to state entities and officials.

132. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
134. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3168
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2009aa-1 (2006)).
135. See, e.g., EnergySolutions, LLC v. Utah, 625 F.3d 1261, 1265–68 (10th Cir. 2010)
(discussing Congress’s delegation of low-level radioactive waste disposal policy to the
states).
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1. The Constitutional Plan
To some degree the constitutional system of federalism contemplates
such congressional sharing of power with state entities. Article I provides
that Congress can consent to state decisions to levy “duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, [or] enter into [an] Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.” 136 The Compact
Clause has been utilized frequently, and Congress long has delegated to
groups of states the power to regulate over subjects such as
transportation, 137 energy, 138 and tax matters. 139 The resulting rules of the
compacts are to be treated as federal law,140 even if the interstate
commissions are not considered federal agencies.141 The fact that the
Founders authorized Congress to consent to state compacts whose authority
could reach issues of national or regional import strongly calls into question
the view that congressional delegation of authority to state entities should
be categorically prohibited. 142
Moreover, Congress since the Founding has recruited state officials to
help enforce federal laws. Congress has authorized state officials to arrest
and punish individuals for violation of federal laws. 143 As the Supreme
Court summarized in United States v. Jones, 144 “from the time of its
establishment [the federal] government has been in the habit of using, with
the consent of the States, their officers, tribunals, and institutions as
agents.” 145 The Court noted that “[t]heir use has not been deemed violative
of any principle or as in any manner derogating from the sovereign
Thus, the Constitution
authority of the federal government.” 146
contemplates far more exercise of executive authority by states than by
private entities.147
To be sure, the Supreme Court has counseled that Congress cannot
compel state entities to enforce or implement federal law. For example, in
New York v. United States 148 the state challenged Congress’s requirement
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
137. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991).
138. See, e.g., Seattle Master Builders Assoc. v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power & Conservation
Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
139. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459–72 (1978).
140. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981).
141. New York v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm’n, 609 F.3d 524, 531 (2d Cir.
2010).
142. Similarly, there is no constitutional impediment to incorporating evolving state law
as the governing rule of decision, as in the FTCA example.
143. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV 62, 80–84
(1990).
144. 109 U.S. 513 (1883) (upholding statute authorizing states to determine compensation
in takings cases).
145. Id. at 519.
146. Id.
147. See also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 411–12 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part).
148. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act that states take
ownership of all internally generated waste upon the request of the waste’s
generator. 149 This regulation arose out of Congress’s effort to provide an
incentive to ensure sufficient disposal sites for low level radioactive waste.
The Court summarized that “Congress may not simply commandeer the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.” 150 Furthermore, “[w]e have always
understood that even where Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.” 151
The Court justified its conclusions in part on the ground that, “where the
Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both
state and federal officials is diminished.”152 State officials might bear the
political ill will from following Congress’s policy even though it was
Congress that devised the law. The Court elaborated upon this rationale in
Printz v. United States. 153 There, the question for resolution concerned
whether Congress could force state officials to conduct background checks
on those seeking to buy handguns. The Court stressed that, to individuals
purchasing handguns, the regulations would appear to come from the state
officials implementing the congressional plan as opposed to Congress.154
As a result, the goal of accountability was undermined.
The Court’s commandeering doctrine, however, permits states and state
officials voluntarily to implement federal law. When state officials decide
on their own to conduct background checks or to take title to waste sites,
they remain accountable, at least in part, for their acts within our federalist
scheme.
Even if Congress has set the policy framework, state
implementation efforts, as long as voluntary, do not fully obfuscate lines of
authority.
State exercise of delegated federal authority undoubtedly strains the
structure of our constitutional system as conventionally understood.
Indeed, Justice Scalia recognized that cost in Printz, noting that widespread
delegations by Congress to state officials would permit such officials “to
implement the program without meaningful Presidential control (if indeed
meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint
and remove).” 155 He continued more forcefully that the unified executive
branch enforcement “would be shattered, and the power of the President
would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without
the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its
laws.” 156

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 149, 153 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (2006)).
Id. at 161 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 166.
Id. at 168.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 930.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 923.
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Yet, the impact on Article II should be the same whether state officials
implement federal law on command or license from Congress—the
President’s appointment and removal powers would be circumvented in
either case. Justice Scalia noted the problem and could only offer that “the
condition of voluntary state participation significantly reduces the ability of
Congress to use this device as a means of reducing the power of the
Presidency.” 157 Delegation to state entities can be reconciled only by dint
of the overriding role of states in the plan of convention. The Founders
anticipated that state entities could play a meaningful role in execution of
federal law. Delegation to state entities may be upheld even where they
would be invalidated if directed toward private entities.
2. Political Accountability
In contrast to private entities, state officials are politically accountable.
They remain subject to the checks and balances in the respective states and
can be held to account by the electorate, or at least by their superiors within
the state government. Should state insurance commissioners adopt medical
loss ratio standards that are unreasonable, they can be chastened by state
chief executives, and if the sheriffs harass citizens over gun registration,
they may see repercussions at the ballot box. Particularly if state officials’
exercise of delegated authority focuses on citizens within their states,
political checks within those states seem adequate to constrain their
authority.
Moreover, under Article VI of the Constitution, state
legislators—unlike private parties—must take an oath of office to support
the Constitution. 158
Consider the delegation to the Delta Regional Authority159 cited by
Justice Breyer in his Free Enterprise Fund dissent. 160 The Authority,
which is funded equally by the Federal Government and the states, is
composed of a federal member and “the Governor (or a designee of the
Governor) of each State in the region that elects to participate in the
Authority.” 161 The Authority approves project and grant proposals “for the
economic development of the region.” 162 Although the Authority plainly
exercises significant power in approving projects for economic
development of the region, political accountability is not lost. Participating
Governors can tout accomplishments of the Authority and burnish their
records, and failures to husband resources wisely may well impair chances
at the next election. The “public” nature of the exercise of authority
provides some support for implementation of federal tasks by state entities.

157. Id. at 923 n.12. The dissent noted the weakness in Justice Scalia’s argument as well.
Id. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
159. 7 U.S.C. § 2009aa-1 (2006).
160. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3168
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
161. 7 U.S.C. § 2009aa-1(a)(2).
162. Id. § 2009aa-1(d)(1).
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3. Potential for Congressional Aggrandizement
The Supreme Court has weighed the potential for aggrandizement
heavily in resolving separation of powers disputes. There is less danger of
congressional aggrandizement when Congress delegates to states as
opposed to private entities. A delegation to a state is much less in the
nature of an appointment—state officials are less likely to feel beholden to
Congress than would private individuals similarly selected. State officials
do not likely stand to gain salary or status from exercising delegated
responsibilities. They seldom would endeavor to placate congressional
views in order to retain their jobs—after all, they owe their authority
principally to the state, not the federal government.
In contrast, consider congressional delegation to an insurance company
that Congress has designated to handle Medicaid claims. The insurance
company recognizes that, should its claim resolution displease Congress—
whether for reasons of inefficiency or error rates—Congress may well
withdraw the delegation. The insurance company might be dependent on
congressional funding for its corporate livelihood. Indeed, self-regulatory
organizations recognize that Congress may impose greater centralized
control over the private sector should it be displeased with the lack of fervor
of its regulatory initiatives as happened with the AICPA. 163 In contrast,
congressional delegation to state entities carries with it much less risk of
continuing oversight or aggrandizement.
Indeed, one of the most critical protections against undue delegation to
administrative agencies by Congress in general is that Congress must be
willing to give up the reins of power. Congressional delegation, in other
words, comes with a price—the loss of control over the shape of the final
policy implemented. That check on congressional delegations, while absent
for many delegations to private entities, exists when Congress delegates to
state entities.
The constitutional recognition for federalism, the comparable
accountability of state as opposed to private officials, and the limited
potential for aggrandizement combine to strengthen the case for permitting
Congress to delegate particular functions to state entities. State officials
can enforce federal law, as with the Brady Bill, without violating the
constitutional structure. Similarly, they can in effect make federal law as
part of a compact consistent with Article II. Our system of federalism
presupposes some limitation on presidential control over authority
delegated from Congress to state entities.

163. A similar example is the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA),
formed in the mid-1980s by industry members trading in swaps and derivatives. See Sean M.
Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 234–38 (2001). The
ISDA lobbied to keep the industry self-regulated. Id. at 245–46. However, presumably
because of the role that swaps played in the market blow up and the collapse of Lehman
Brothers and AIG in 2008, swaps are now regulated by the SEC and CFTC under the DoddFrank Act. Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701–74, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–802 (2010).
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B. Limitations on Delegation to State Entities
At the same time, delegations to state entities should not be immune from
separation of powers scrutiny. Without teasing out an elaborate theory, let
me suggest two contexts in which Article II concerns arguably trump those
of federalism: first, when Congress delegates authority that diminishes
another of the President’s authorities explicit or implied under Article II,
such as the foreign affairs power; second, and more tentatively, when state
entities’ exercise of authority permits one block of states to foist costs on
states disfavored by the congressional majority.
1. Independent Article II Powers
Congressional delegation to state entities may, at times, rob the President
of an Article II power other than law enforcement. Although the
constitutional design and history suggest that the President must share some
enforcement authority with state entities and officials, the President should
not necessarily brook Congress’s delegation of other constitutionally
grounded powers. For instance, congressional delegation to the NAIC of
the power to appoint the head of Medicare would plainly contravene the
Appointment power in Article II. Similarly, congressional delegation of the
pardon power 164 to a state entity would be invalid.
Moreover, consider a hypothetical congressional delegation to a state
compact comprising the border states of the authority to enter into trade
agreements with Latin America. Tariff and trade policy might thereby be
executed outside the watch of the President. A few states together, upon
delegation from Congress, would have the power to bind the entire country
in setting relations abroad. Needless to say, the interests of respective states
in terms of international relations vary. Indeed, Congress approved a
provision in the Great Lakes Basin Compact establishing that “the Province
of Ontario and the Province of Quebec, or either of them, may become
states party to this compact by taking such action as their laws and the laws
of the Government of Canada may prescribe for adherence thereto.”165
Congress empowered the compact to pursue measures with a palpable
impact on foreign affairs.
The Constitution recognizes the potential conflict, but only in part.
Article I itself forbids states from “enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; [or] grant[ing] Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”166 That
prohibition suggests a constitutional awareness that Article II at times
trumps federalism. But, Article I does not limit congressionally approved
compacts that do not fall within the category of “Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation,” even those with foreign states. 167 The line between
164. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
165. Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, art. II(B), 82 Stat. 414, 414 (1968);
see MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 156–57
(1971).
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
167. Id.
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“Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation” and compacts with foreign states is not
self-evident, and the Supreme Court has stated that any such distinction in
the minds of the Framers has been lost to history. 168 Article II must be
accommodated with Article I in some fashion.
Although a congressional stamp of approval can authorize states to
execute the law, Congress cannot resort to delegation to state entities to
strip the President of his role in foreign affairs.169 The Constitution may
not sort out the overlap between federalism and separation of powers
concerns, but it plants the seeds for an accommodation.
Indeed, comparable concerns have led the Supreme Court to strike down
state laws that have interfered with the United States’ foreign policy. In
Zschernig v. Miller, 170 for example, Oregon law had prohibited any nonU.S. citizen from inheriting property if his or her home nation denied U.S.
citizens that right. 171 After losing in Oregon’s courts, an East German
citizen successfully sought review in the Supreme Court, which reversed
the Oregon decision on the ground that the state statute impermissibly
intruded into the President’s foreign affairs power.172 For another example,
Massachusetts in 1996 established a restrictive purchasing list targeting
companies doing business with Burma (now named Myanmar) to protest
the dictatorship’s policies. 173 That action placed the United States in the
awkward position of defending the Massachusetts approach before the
World Trade Organization while attempting behind the scenes to pressure
Massachusetts to change the law. 174 Firms doing business in Burma
challenged the law, and the courts invalidated the measure. The Supreme
Court in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council 175 stressed in reviewing
the Massachusetts measure that the state’s action interfered with subsequent
congressional delegation of authority to the President to impose sanctions
on Burma. 176
In the above examples, Congress did not sanction the state interference in
foreign affairs. Congressional approval of such state actions, however,
nonetheless might intrude into the President’s constitutionally grounded
authority to superintend relations with foreign states.
Perhaps
congressional authorization can alter the boundaries in which states are free

168. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 460–72 (1978)
(distinguishing between alliances and other agreements lost in history).
169. Cf. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 (1833)
(commenting that states cannot enter into any agreements with foreign powers).
170. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
171. Id. at 430–31 & n.1.
172. Id. at 436 (“[S]tate involvement in foreign affairs and international relations [are]
matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government . . . .”).
173. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366–68 (2000).
174. See id. at 383–84.
175. 530 U.S. 363.
176. Id. at 374–77; see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–29 (2003)
(striking down California’s facilitation of Holocaust era insurance claims); Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum, 592 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that California cannot
extend the statute of limitations for recovering art stolen during the Holocaust).
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to act, but congressional delegation can no more vest in states the power to
initiate hostilities abroad than it can authorize states to enter into treaties.
Consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes v. Jennison. 177 The
Supreme Court confronted the question of whether Vermont could agree
with Canadian authorities to extradite fugitives in the absence of
congressional sanction. A majority of the eight Justices participating
evidently concurred in Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s reasoning that the
extradition agreement was illegal, but could be rectified by congressional
consent. 178 The Court ignored the potential separation of powers
ramifications of Vermont’s unilateral determination to enter into an
extradition agreement with a sovereign nation. In light of the President’s
constitutionally grounded powers over foreign relations—the power to
propose treaties, appoint ambassadors, and be commander-in-chief of the
armed forces—the Holmes Court should have struck down Vermont’s
arrangement on Article II grounds as well. Congress cannot enlist
particular states to forge foreign policy. As Zschernig and Crosby
demonstrate in the related context sketched above, there will be line
drawing issues, but state delegations should be judicially policed to ensure
that the delegations do not permit intrusion into the President’s powers
other than in law enforcement. The historic understanding of shared power
between states and the federal government does not extend that far. Free
Enterprise Fund suggests that delegation to state entities should be
scrutinized at least to determine whether the President exercises sufficient
control over foreign affairs.
2. Delegations Permitting Discrimination Against Nonparticipating States
Arguably, Congress should also be limited in delegating to state entities
when the delegation permits states to infringe the interests of states that
have been excluded from the delegation.179 Although delegations to a wide
swath of state officials as in the NAIC example would not be problematic,
delegations to a compact of states could harm nonparticipating states. As a
theoretical matter, the President’s Article II powers are designed in part to
ensure accountability for a national constituency. As the Court in Free
Enterprise Fund framed it, the “Constitution requires that a President
chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.”180 If
congressional delegations to state entities result in injury to nonparticipating
states, then bypassing the President causes an independent harm in
precluding the check of presidential oversight—oversight from the only

177. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
178. Id. at 570 (“The power of deciding whether a fugitive from a foreign nation should
or should not be surrendered . . . is one of the powers that the states are forbidden to exercise
without the consent of Congress.”).
179. In essence, the concern is that the political safeguards of federalism do not protect
the interests of states that cannot exert sufficient influence in Congress as a whole.
180. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155–56
(2010).
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politically elected official beholden to a national constituency. 181 As
Professor Calabresi expresses the presidential advantage in a slightly
different context, “[t]he only official with any incentive under our present
electoral structure to stop this [effort to impose costs on others] is the
President who is (along with the Vice President) our only nationally elected
official.” 182 Similar sentiments support presidential line item vetoes—only
the President arguably has the national perspective to stop earmarks that
redound to the benefit only of particular sectors of the country. 183
The Supreme Court on occasion has stated that the congressional consent
requirement in the Compact Clause was designed in part to prevent
participating states from shifting costs or harms to nonparticipating ones.
Compacts must be submitted for congressional approval in part to guard
against, in Justice Byron White’s words in United States Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Commission, “encroachments upon non-compact States.”184
Consider congressional delegation to a compact of states to regulate
production of coal in the Northeastern states. In making its determination,
the compact might be tempted to shift costs of externalities such as
pollution to states in the Midwest. 185 Similarly, states may urge Congress
to set up conditional funding programs that they know other states cannot
take advantage of. 186 In U.S. Steel itself, plaintiffs challenging the compact
argued that the states participating in the compact might agree to particular
tax formulas to draw businesses from nonparticipating states. 187
The continuing litigation over disposal of low level radioactive waste
manifests the risk of state v. state friction. Congress authorized compacts to
encourage states to determine among themselves which states would create
and maintain waste sites, and how other members of the compact would
furnish sufficient incentives to the state in which the site is located. The

181. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 65–66 (1995). Calabresi argues in part that the unitary executive is
designed to prevent members of Congress from legislating purely to benefit particular
geographic sectors. For a response, see Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State
Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075, 1110 (1997), doubting that such
concerns should lead to curbing delegations to state officials, as long as only citizens within
the states are affected.
182. Calabresi, supra note 181, at 35.
183. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Petty Larceny of the Police Power, 86 CALIF. L.
REV. 655 (1998) (reviewing FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997)); Aaron D. Zibart, Note, Eulogizing the Line
Item Veto Act: Clinton v. City of New York and the Wisdom of Presidential Legislating, 88
KY. L.J. 505 (2000).
184. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 494 (1978); see also
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 726 (1838).
185. Cf. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 30–31 (1951) (rejecting
challenge to compact addressing discharge into Ohio River). See also the discussion in
Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997), addressing the difficulty of confining
impact of pollution to states within a single compact or alliance.
186. See Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 963 (2001).
187. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473.

2011]

THE RAMIFICATIONS OF FREE ENTERPRISE FUND

2451

states involved in the compact have little interest in permitting waste
generated outside the compact to be stored in their sites. 188
At times, consumer interests within the states may restrain state efforts to
impose costs on businesses outside the state because of the concern for
price increases. The compact, however, may override such objections,
particularly if the states can ensure that much of the costs of any
development flow downstream.
In such cases, the congressional consent requirement might be
insufficient to prevent encroachment on interests of states outside the
compact. Although the prospect of a presidential veto of the law setting up
the compact exists, establishment of a compact itself would rarely reveal
any intent to harm nonparticipating states. Indeed, there is some evidence
that participating states have utilized compacts to shift costs to those states
not included, 189 although empirical evidence as to the incidence of cost
shifting is extremely limited.
To be sure, states may always lose in Congress. On some issues,
agrarian states may win, on others, it may be coal-producing states, and for
still others, it may be states in which federal military bases are located. The
genius of the Virginia Plan 190 was to minimize the potential that small
states would lose out consistently in the legislative process. Given the
shifting coalitions, a state with an adverse interest today might become an
ally tomorrow, and that possibility restrains larger states from encroaching
too much on smaller or disfavored states’ interests. Moreover, the need to
present each proposed bill to the President also works to minimize the
potential for states to exact too much benefit at the expense of others in the
system. The threat of a veto can squelch any such power play.
After congressional delegation to a compact, 191 however, there is no
ongoing supervision by the President. State officials need not comply with
presidential circulars; nor are they subject to the President’s removal
authority. State compacts may well decide to visit the burdens of regulation
on nonparticipating states.

188. See, e.g., EnergySolutions, LLC v. Utah, 625 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2010) (involving
an operator of a waste site resorting to the courts in an effort to permit waste from outside
the compact states to be stored at the site).
189. See generally Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels and Congressional Consent, 68
MO. L. REV. 285, 289 (2003). Greve cites several examples, such as the Northeast Dairy
Compact, 7 U.S.C. § 7526 (2006), to demonstrate the potential for state compacts to result in
harm to nonparticipating states. See also Joseph J. Spengler, The Economic Limitations to
Certain Uses of Interstate Compacts, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41, 42 (1937) (“[C]ontrol by
compacting state may injure the inhabitants of non-compacting states.”). Spengler uses the
example of a compact designed to control production of cotton. Id. at 44. Cotton-producing
states would benefit, while those outside the compact whose citizens purchase cotton would
have to pay more for the cotton. Id.
190. See THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 23–26
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., int’l ed. 1920).
191. For a cynical summary of delegation in general, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION
(1993).
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Contrast the delegation context to Congress’s role in a Dormant
Commerce Clause challenge. There, as well, Congress has the opportunity
to ratify one state’s efforts to impose costs on businesses or citizens living
outside its borders. 192 As the Court summarized in Associated Industries of
Missouri v. Lohman 193 the Dormant Commerce Clause “prohibits economic
protectionism . . . regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” 194 The prospect of a
presidential veto exists to temper any inclinations by members of Congress
to sustain a discriminatory measure. 195 Although a congressional override
of a veto can enact a discriminatory measure into law,196 the requirement of
presentment mutes that concern.
Yet, one critical distinction exists—in the Dormant Commerce Clause
context, Congress directly assesses the benefits and drawbacks of the state
law that allegedly burdens out of state interests. In contrast, the potential
burden or encroachment on disfavored states arises at a different stage in
the delegation context—only after Congress and the President have agreed
to the delegation. The state compact’s action need not be channeled
through Congress or the President before becoming law. As with other
delegations of administrative authority, there are political checks before the
delegation, but not afterwards. Just as legislation is subject to greater
formal political checks than authority exercised by administrative agencies,
so the protections for states are greater for legislation than for authority
exercised by other states pursuant to a congressional delegation.
The theoretical risk of encroachment among the states, however, does not
suggest an easily enforceable line to draw.197 Tests would have to be
forged, as under the Dormant Commerce Clause, to determine when states’
exercise of delegated authority, particularly through compacts, results in an
unacceptable harm to an unrepresented state. The contours of this newly
devised subpart of the Nondelegation Doctrine would be difficult to derive.
Courts presumably would consider whether to focus principally on the
192. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648 (1981);
Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 542–43 (1949). The only congressional constraints may be the
Commerce Clause, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses. W. & S. Life
Insurance, 451 U.S. at 655–56.
193. 511 U.S. 641 (1994).
194. Id. at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Exploitation of nonparticipating states by those in compacts is so likely “that
Congress is called in to review the arrangement at the outset.” Saul Levmore, Interstate
Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 570 n.17 (1983).
196. As the Court stated in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), “[i]t is well established
that Congress may authorize the States to engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause
would otherwise forbid.” Id. at 138.
197. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (“[W]e have
almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). For a discussion of the Tenth Amendment as underenforced, see Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). For an argument that the
Due Process Clause is also underenforced, see Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an
Enforcement Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1149 (1998).
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intent underlying the challenged measure or, rather, its results, whether a
new hydroelectric plant or standard setting for coal production. One of the
problems of any test is that nonparticipating states always are injured if the
participating states help themselves financially through the compact and, as
a consequence, make their venues more attractive for business. Courts
would have to determine which measures aimed at advancing the economic
wealth of participating states impermissibly target nonparticipating states
and which reflect run of the mill efforts aimed toward economic
development of the region.
More problematically, there is no remedy to apply unless courts step into
the shoes of the President to determine if the President would have
approved the measure had he been afforded the opportunity to review the
policy set by the compact. In essence, courts would have to second-guess
presidential policy in determining which state measures—pursuant to
congressionally delegated authority—unconstitutionally burden interests of
other states.
But that very second-guessing of presidential policy would itself be
problematic, for the President would have no direct way to review the
judicial decision to determine whether to permit the delegation to stand. In
the Dormant Commerce Clause setting, by contrast, Congress can consent
to state initiatives that burden interstate commerce. In the delegation
context, however, the President would not have the final say.
Judicial enforcement itself, therefore, would intrude into Article II
prerogatives. Judges cannot effectively evaluate policies implemented by
state entities pursuant to congressional delegations. In short, courts can
review states’ exercise of congressionally delegated authority to determine
if the delegate’s action is ultra vires, but courts cannot realistically step into
the shoes of the President and invalidate exercises of authority that impose
costs on other states.
Finally, the difficulty of reviewing the exercise of authority delegated to
compacts reinforces the importance of the ex ante decision to approve the
initial delegation or formation of a compact. Congress and the President
should be aware of the potential that states may exercise delegated authority
in a way that disadvantages other states’ interests. Moreover, that
possibility may well prove reason for courts to construe the terms of
congressional delegations to states narrowly. 198 Courts should be stinting
when reviewing challenges to authority exercised by congressionally
approved compacts given that the policy formulated after such delegations
evades the presidential superintendence designed to ensure that states do
not take advantage of others. Such strict construction reflects an
accommodation between the federalism and Article II principles underlying
our Constitution.

198. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (construing delegation narrowly to
avoid constitutional question). See also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 112
(1976) (construing delegation to Civil Service Commission narrowly to limit power to
exclude resident aliens from federal workforce).

2454

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

CONCLUSION
To date, discussion of Free Enterprise Fund has focused on its potential
impact to rigidify structures of administrative agencies. If the President
must supervise administrative officials through the removal authority, then
Congress cannot innovate as much in creating administrative entities that
are outside the political influence of the President. Justice Breyer’s dissent
vividly illustrates the ramifications of the decision if applied outside the
narrow setting of the PCAOB.
The broader implications of the decision, however, ultimately may rest
with constricted opportunities for Congress to delegate authority to state
and private entities. Congress typically leaves the President with no
removal authority when delegating outside the federal government. The
logic of Free Enterprise Fund strongly suggests that Congress may not,
consistent with Article II, delegate significant authority to private and state
entities. Although the decision does not elaborate on what constitutes
“significant authority,” it imperils a wide range of structures permitting
private and state entities to participate in shaping federal law, including the
Federal Open Market Committee, self-regulated organizations that have
received Congress’s imprimatur, and congressionally approved state
compacts.
Free Enterprise Fund should prompt reconsideration of authority
delegated by Congress to private entities. Executive branch oversight not
only comports with Article II, but can protect private parties from
overreaching. Preventing Congress from delegating to private parties
ensures that public authority will be implemented in a way that can be
traced to the President. In particular, Congress after Free Enterprise Fund
may not be able to delegate decision-making authority to groups such as the
National Academy of Sciences or enforcement authority to self-regulatory
organizations unless there is sufficiently stringent oversight by Article II
entities.
In contrast to private actors, however, state actors in large part are
politically accountable, and there is little risk of congressional
aggrandizement from delegation to state entities. State officials should be
able to enforce federal law, Congress should be able to incorporate state law
by reference, and state compacts should be able to fashion federal policy.
Courts should intervene only when compacts or other state entities infringe
upon a distinct presidential power under Article II, such as the power to
supervise foreign affairs. Thus, while delegations to private individuals and
entities should be curtailed in light of the lack of presidential oversight,
Free Enterprise Fund should leave untouched most delegations to state
entities: our federalist structure presupposes a limitation on the President’s
Article II responsibility to superintend enforcement of delegated authority.

